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Alaska Rule 26: A Quixotic Venture
Into the World of Mandatory
Disclosure
The Alaska Supreme Court has recently voted to amend Civil
Rule 26, which sets forth the general provisions governing
discovery. The new rule mandates that parties disclose certain
types of information without waiting for a formal discovery
request. This note argues that while the requirements for
mandatory disclosure are a positive step in reducing cost, abuse
and delay in litigation, they are too limited in scope and, hence,fail to address the problems inherent in the discovery process.
This note concludes by offering an alternative to Rule 26, linking
the use of mandatory disclosure to a system of differentiated case
management.
I. INTRODUCTION
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 1 states that "these rules shall
be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determina-
tion of every action and proceeding."' In an effort to ensure that
this mandate was being met, a special Alaska Bar Association
Committee was created by Special Order of Chief Justice Daniel A.
Moore, effective November 5, 1992. The Committee was "estab-
lished for the general purpose of studying civil litigation abuse, cost
and delay; and for the express purpose of proposing rules which
will reduce discovery abuse and to make the civil judicial system in
Alaska more efficient, expeditious, less costly, and more accessible
to the public.",2 The order also directed the Committee to "review
and investigate" the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure,3 which were
amended in July of 1992 as part of an effort by the Arizona bar to
improve the civil litigation process in that state.4 The central
feature of the new Arizona Rules was a system of mandatory
Copyright © 1994 by Alaska Law Review
1. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 1.
2. Chief Justice's Special Order Creating Special Alaska Bar Association
Committee (Nov. 5, 1992) (on file with author).
3. Id.
4. See ARIz. R. CIV. P. 26.1, court cmt. to 1991 amend.
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disclosure that replaced, in large part, the traditional discovery
system formerly operating in Arizona.5
Following its review of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Alaska Special Committee drafted proposed Rule 26.1,
modelled after Arizona Rule 26.1, which would have instituted
sweeping disclosure requirements in Alaska. The full Civil Rules
Committee reviewed the proposal and decided to draft a new, less
radical proposal. This second proposal was closely modelled on the
new Federal Rule 26, which includes fairly limited disclosure
requirements. 6 The Alaska Supreme Court then reviewed both
proposals and in June of 1994 adopted a new version of Rule 26
that is very similar but not identical to the new federal rule.7
Mandated disclosure, even in a limited form, should streamline
and simplify litigation, and, in that sense, the Alaska Supreme
Court's adoption of Rule 26 is a positive step. Rule 26 is too
conservative, however, to effect significant changes in the way
litigation, in general, and discovery, in particular, are conducted.
Unlike Arizona Rule 26.1, the new Alaska Rule 26 does not
fundamentally alter the discovery process. Rather, like the federal
rule upon which it is based, Alaska Rule 26 is best viewed as an
attempt to refine the existing system of discovery, a system that is
inherently flawed. Although the ultimate success of Rule 26 in
improving the litigation process can be judged only after the rule
has been in effect for a period of time, the failure of Rule 26 to
effectively address the problems inherent in a system of discovery
suggests that it will fail to bring about significant reductions in
"civil litigation cost, abuse or delay."
Part II of this note discusses why discovery is inherently flawed
as a system for gathering information in litigation and specifically
analyzes why Alaska Rule 26 fails to address those flaws. Part III
of this note examines the benefits of a disclosure system, as well as
the problems that such a system either fails to address or creates on
its own. Part IV sets forth an alternative proposal for reforming
Alaska's civil litigation process. By establishing a differentiated
case management system in which the relative amounts of disclo-
sure and discovery would vary according to the complexity of the
5. ARIz. R. Civ. P. 26.1.
6. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 was amended as of December 1, 1993,
to include disclosure requirements.
7. See infra Appendix A for the text of Rule 26. This new rule will apply to
all cases filed on or after July 15, 1995.
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case, this proposal attempts to retain the best parts of a disclosure
system while minimizing its negative aspects.
II. THE NEED FOR REFORM
A. The System of Discovery Is Inherently Flawed
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been immensely
influential in the years since their adoption in 1938. To a signifi-
cant degree, many states, including Alaska, have modelled their
own rules of civil procedure after the Federal Rules. The adoption
of rules providing for the exchange of information by the opposing
parties before trial through the use of various discovery procedures
was a major innovation in federal civil procedure. These rules
attempted to eliminate "trial by ambush," while ensuring that
disputes were resolved on the basis of all relevant information.'
Instead of opening up the litigation process, however, discovery has
become, in many cases, an obstacle to resolving cases on the merits.
Dissatisfaction with the discovery process has become increasingly
prevalent, and many commentators contend that the time has come
for a major revamping of the process through which information is
exchanged before trial.9
Critics of the discovery process argue that it drives up costs,
lengthens the time needed to resolve disputes and encourages
lawyers to act in an overly aggressive and adversarial manner."
Unfortunately, there is little statistical evidence to support these
contentions, and most critics tend to offer strictly anecdotal
evidence. Nevertheless, the pervasive nature and high level of
dissatisfaction with discovery is reflected in both critical complaints
about the system in law review articles" and in recent efforts at
the federal level and in many states to reform the process. 2
8. Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing
Their Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2197, 2197-98 (1989).
9. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process,
and Discovery Reform, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 703 (1989) ("Discovery, originally
conceived as the servant of the litigants to assist them in reaching a just outcome,
now tends to dominate the litigation and inflict disproportionate costs and
burdens.").
10. See, e.g., Thomas A. Zlaket, Encouraging Litigators to Be Lawyers:
Arizona's New Civil Rules, 25 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1 (1993).
11. See, e.g., Schwarzer, supra note 9.
12. Efforts to reform the discovery process have taken place at both the
federal and state levels. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 was revised as of
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In 1983, in response to the growing criticism of discovery, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to give judges a
greater role in the management of all pretrial proceedings,13 a
move designed to take some control over discovery out of the
hands of the lawyers and place it in the hands of an impartial party.
At the same time, Federal Rule 26 was amended to require
sanctions for abuse of the discovery process. 4 Alaska has also
incorporated provisions for judicial involvement in pretrial
proceedings into its code of civil procedure, 5 but these provisions
have apparently done little to solve the problems associated with
discovery, as evidenced by the recent push for reform. 6 Authors
continue to publish articles critical of discovery, 7 and further
amendments to the Federal Rules dealing with discovery have
recently been adopted.'"
The failure of previous reforms to solve the problems with
discovery is not surprising because the source of those problems is
based not in the phrasing of the rules, but rather in the very nature
of the American legal system.'9 America's litigation process is
grounded in an adversary system in which opposing attorneys
attempt to present the facts and issues in the light most favorable
to their side. The prevailing belief is that through this adversarial
process the truth will ultimately emerge, and cases will be correctly
decided. Ideally, discovery is supposed to complement the
adversarial process by allowing each side to obtain whatever
relevant information may be in the other party's possession before
trial. If discovery works as planned, both sides should be able to
December 1, 1993, to provide for limited pretrial disclosure of information. In
addition, under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1993),
several federal district courts have experimented with various ways of improving
the litigation process. At the state level, Arizona shifted in July 1992 from a
system of discovery modelled on the Federal Rules to a system involving a high
degree of mandatory disclosure.
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
14. Id. 2 6(g)(3).
15. See the versions of Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure 16 and 26 that are
effective until July 15, 1995. Alaska R. Civ. P. 16, 26 (1992).
16. Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 16 has been significantly revised. The new
Rule 16 will take effect on July 15, 1995.
17. See, e.g., Zlaket, supra note 10.
18. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 is indicative, having recently been
amended to include disclosure requirements. FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
19. See Schwarzer, supra note 9, at 704-05, 712-16.
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realistically evaluate their case, which should in turn promote
settlement or, in the alternative, ensure that all the relevant facts
are brought out at trial.' Unfortunately, the fundamental premis-
es that underlie the system of discovery are at odds with the nature
of the adversary process.21
The notion that the adversary system has produced undesirable
patterns in the process of litigation in America is not new. As
early as 1906, Roscoe Pound stated:
A no less potent source of irritation [with the administra-
tion of justice] lies in our American exaggerations of the
common law contentious procedure.... It leads counsel to
forget that they are officers of the court and to deal with the
rules of law and procedure exactly as the professional football
coach with the rules of sport.'
For better or worse, in recent years a lawyer's ethical duty to
represent his client zealously' has become intertwined with the
adversary system to the extent that a lawyer is now required to do
anything and everything within the bounds of the law to ensure
that his client prevails.24 Such a philosophy lends itself to abuse
of the discovery process.
To ensure that every possible angle has been covered, a lawyer
may feel compelled to engage in excessive discovery, driving up
costs and lengthening the time to trial.' The recipient of a
discovery request, on the other hand, has a natural tendency to
view that request in the narrowest possible light.26 The result is
that these two trends are mutually reinforcing. The Special
Committee explicitly recognized this problem in its comments on
proposed Rule 26.1, stating that "[a] party possessing information
clearly relevant and harmful to its own case is permitted to remain
silent, hoping the other party will not properly ask for disclo-
sure."'27 The adversary process rewards and encourages such
20. Id. at 703.
21. Id. at 705.
22. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administra-
tion of Justice, Address Before a Convention of the American Bar Association
(Aug. 26, 1906), in 35 F.R.D. 241, 281 (1964).
23. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.3 (1983).
24. Schwarzer, supra note 9, at 714-16.
25. Lawrence M. Frankel, Disclosure in the Federal Courts: A Cure for
Discovery Ills?, 25 ARIz. ST. L.J. 249, 256-57, 262 (1993).
26. Id. at 262.
27. Proposed ALASKA R. Civ. P. 26.1, committee cmt. (on file with author).
Although this first proposal, based on Arizona Rule 26.1, was ultimately rejected,
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behavior by allowing a party that can avoid disclosing damaging
information to improve its chances of winning the lawsuit.
Consequently, discovery becomes an increasingly burdensome,
yet important, part of litigation. Parties strive to use discovery not
as a simple means of placing the relevant information on the table,
but as a weapon to be used to control the outcome of the litigation
itself. Judge Karl S. Johnstone, a member of the Committee that
drafted the new rules, wrote that "[tioday, trial, which was the
focus of dispute resolution many years ago, is but the tip of the
litigation iceberg. Discovery has become the main event in
litigation. The price of this event is greatly increased cost, and
delay."'  Some attorneys and their clients may even use the cost
of discovery to their advantage, as they attempt to use discovery to
grind down a financially weaker opponent. Judge Johnstone has
written, "[v]iewing the problem objectively, however, there is no
doubt that at times discovery is being used as a weapon to harass,
discourage and exhaust the opponent rather than to gather needed
information."29 Such a strategy is fundamentally at odds with the
goal of the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure to provide for the just
and inexpensive resolution of disputes.3 °
The solution is either to change lawyers' attitudes or to
change the system of exchanging information so that it no longer
fundamentally conflicts with the adversary process. Although the
former might be more effective in the long run, changing deeply
rooted attitudes takes time and may be impossible. For this reason,
the better short-term solution is to reconstruct the system of
exchanging information so as to insulate it as much as possible
from the corrupting influence of the adversary process. In time, a
system of disclosure may reshape lawyers' attitudes and lead to
greater cooperation and professionalism among the members of the
bar.31
the Committee's comments are still useful for their insight into the problems with
discovery.
28. Karl S. Johnstone, Litigation Reform: The Public Wins 1 (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
29. Id. at 3.
30. ALASKA R. CIv. P. 1.
31. ARIz. R. CIv. R. 26.1, state bar committee notes.
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B. The Shortcomings of Alaska Rule 26
Although Rule 26 does represent an improvement over the old
rules in which no disclosure was required, its disclosure require-
ments fail to resolve the problems with discovery on both a
practical and a theoretical basis. The limited disclosure require-
ments largely leave intact the current system of discovery, complete
with all of its inherent flaws. These disclosure requirements appear
to be aimed at refining and improving the discovery process, not
replacing it. From a practical standpoint, Rule 26 is fairly limited
in scope, with the result being that many cases may still require
extensive discovery. The disclosure requirements of Rule 26
function essentially as a set of standard interrogatories that any
competent litigator would file early in a case.32 In adopting Rule
26, the Alaska Supreme Court failed to recognize that incremental
refinements in the process cannot address the fundamental flaws of
discovery.
The disclosure required under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), (D) and (E)
is limited to information "relevant to disputed facts alleged with
particularity in the pleadings,"33 a limitation that is lacking under
Arizona Rule 26.1. 4 This limitation was likely incorporated in
response to fears that without such limitation, an incompetent or
lazy attorney would be able to file a complaint and then rely on his
opponent to supply the information necessary to make his or her
case. Ultimately, however, the limitation restricts the amount of
information that must be disclosed and inevitably leads a party to
engage in discovery to obtain necessary information. To the extent
that the "pled with particularity" requirement necessitates reliance
on discovery, it simply fosters a continuation of the problems in the
litigation process bred by the use of discovery.
This limitation also creates a rather perverse situation when
examined in light of Alaska's notice pleading system. Under Rule
26, information must be disclosed by the opponent only with regard
to the facts pled with particularity. Thus, a party needs to offer
specific and detailed factual information in its pleading to take full
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee notes. The disclosure required
under the federal rule and under Alaska Rule 26 is very similar in scope.
33. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A),(B),(D),(E).
34. Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 26.1(a)(9), in general, requires disclosure
of all information a party "believes may be relevant." This is a much broader
standard than one that is limited to facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings.
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advantage of the disclosure provisions. If a party does not possess
details and facts about its claim because the majority of the
relevant information lies in the hands of its opponent, that party
will be unable to make specific factual allegations, and the
disclosure required of its opponent will be limited correspondingly.
Consequently, parties most in need of information from their
opponent are the least likely to receive such information through
disclosure. Although the party seeking information may ultimately
get what it needs through discovery, the fact that it is forced to use
discovery to obtain basic information undermines the very purpose
for instituting a system of disclosure.
Under Alaska Rule 26(a)(1)(D), a party must describe
documents only by category and location; it need not furnish them.
Moreover, as previously noted, disclosure of documents is limited
to those documents relevant to disputed facts alleged with particu-
larity in the pleadings.35 These limitations on disclosure built into
Rule 26(a)(1)(D) are such that parties can still hide damaging
documents, either by burying them under broad categories or by
simply keeping them secret altogether if the other party does not
allege sufficient facts to mandate disclosure. The result of these
loopholes in the disclosure requirements is the use of discovery to
obtain the necessary information.
Finally, although parties must identify their witnesses, they
need not disclose the substance of the expected testimony.
36
Although these witnesses will often be deposed, at which time the
opposing counsel can discover the substance of their testimony, the
length and cost of the depositions will be greater than if counsel
knows what the substance of the testimony will be prior to the
deposition.
III. THE MERITS OF A DISCLOSURE-BASED SYSTEM IN THE
LITIGATION PROCESS
A. The Advantages of a Disclosure-Based System
1. Arizona Rule 26.1 as a ModeL In recent years, the
concept of replacing traditional discovery with a system of
mandatory disclosure has been a popular proposal for remedying
35. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B).
36. Id. 26(a)(3)(A).
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the ills of discovery.37 The extent to which states have been
willing to embrace a system of disclosure, however, has varied
considerably. Arizona Rule 26.1, adopted in 1992, incorporates
extensive disclosure requirements and will be used in this note as
a model for the type of disclosure requirements that should be
instituted in Alaska.
Under Arizona Rule 26.1, disclosure is extensive and discovery
has largely been relegated to a process for filling gaps in the
disclosure statement.3' Arizona Rule 26.1 requires parties, in
general, to turn over any information that the party believes may
be relevant to the issues in the case.39 The language of this
proposal is very broad and was undoubtedly drafted as part of an
effort to prevent creative attorneys from using technicalities to
refrain from disclosing damaging information. Specifically, Arizona
Rule 26.1 forces a party to disclose everything from the names of
persons whom the party believes may have relevant information4
to the legal theory upon which each claim or defense is based.4
The Rule also requires that a party provide a list and copies of
relevant documents that the party knows to exist, regardless of
whether those documents are in the party's possession, custody or
control.42 Regarding witnesses, Arizona Rule 26.1 requires a party
to disclose the identity of witnesses that it expects to call at trial
and to provide a summary of the subject matter about which each
witness might be called to testify.43 Furthermore, the duty to
disclose under the Arizona rule is a continuing one: as new
information comes into the knowledge or possession of one party,
that party must disclose the information in a timely fashion."
The penalties for violating the disclosure requirements are
severe, ranging from the exclusion of undisclosed evidence45 to
37. New disclosure requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 were
effective as of December 1, 1993. Commentators such as Judge William
Schwarzer, supra note 9, and Judge Thomas Zlaket, supra note 10, have also
argued in favor of disclosure.
38. Traditional discovery methods are still available under Arizona Rule 26.1,
but they are subject to strict numerical limits.
39. See ARIz. R. CIrv. P. 26.1(a)(4).
40. Id. 26.1(a)(4).
41. Id. 26.1(a)(2).
42. Id. 26.1(a)(9).
43. Id. 26.1(a)(3).
44. Id 26.1(b)(2).
45. Id. 26.1(c).
1994]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
monetary sanctions.46 Indeed, a strict sanctioning system must be
a cornerstone of any new disclosure system and can be viewed as
a response to the perception that many of the problems with
discovery are exacerbated by the failure of judges to punish
violations.47
The theoretical advantage of an extensive disclosure system is
that it removes many of the opportunities for abuse that exist with
discovery. In essence, disclosure is designed to remove the
adversarial component from the pretrial exchange of information,
confining the adversary process to the location where it properly
belongs, the trial.48 Disclosure is also designed to elevate sub-
stance over form, a goal that Arizona Rule 26.1 particularly stresses
through the requirement that a party disclose information "it
believes may be relevant."49  This language creates a broad
standard and indicates an intent to promote liberal disclosure to
avoid the technical game playing that can occur under discovery.
The standard under Arizona Rule 26.1 is simple. If information is
relevant and would have to be disclosed if properly requested, then
that information, good and bad, must be turned over, without
request, as part of the disclosure statement. Assuming both sides
make a good faith effort to comply with these standards, the time
needed for and the cost of obtaining information in litigation
should decrease.
2. Disclosure Should Accelerate the Resolution of Cases.
Disclosure as implemented under Arizona Rule 26.1 should
accelerate the resolution of cases for two reasons. First, because
both parties must hand over all relevant information at an early
point in the litigation process, they should be able to promptly
assess the merits of their respective positions and move toward
settlement.0 Parties will also no longer have an incentive to delay
settlement in the hope that they will be able to win an undeserved
victory at trial because their opponent failed to discover an
important piece of information. Second, disclosure will eliminate
46. Id. 26.1(e).
47. The court comment to Rule 26.1 stresses the need to deal with abuses in
a "strong and forthright fashion." Id. 26.1, court cmt.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., id. 26.1(a)(4).
50. Id., state bar committee notes.
[Vol. 11:2
1994] RULE 26 347
the time-consuming task of developing a formal discovery request,
thereby reducing preparation time for trial.
The available statistics bear out these conclusions. Prior to
adopting a disclosure system statewide, Arizona implemented its
disclosure rule in a test program in a single county." Under the
test program, the Superior Court was assigned 8,288 cases during
an eighteen-month period.' Cases employing disclosure were
terminated almost two months earlier on average than cases using
traditional discovery methods. 3 In all but complex cases, parties
using disclosure took fewer depositions and made fewer requests
for admissions of fact, for answers to interrogatories and for
production of documents. 4 Disclosure made no difference in the
use of such techniques in complex cases.5  Interviews with
Arizona attorneys who operated under the disclosure system
revealed that disclosure significantly reduced the amount of time
needed to exchange information. 6
3. Decreased Costs. A system based on disclosure rather
than discovery should also prove to be a less expensive method of
exchanging information. Discovery has two features that tend to
drive up costs. First, when combined with a lawyer's natural desire
to make sure that every possible angle has been explored, the
billable hour system lends itself to excessive discovery. 7 Indeed,
some lawyers may believe that to effectively represent their client
they must chase down every piece of information that is even
remotely relevant.5 If a disclosure-based system is put in place
and disclosure is conducted in good faith, in most cases the need
for additional discovery should be greatly reduced, and the
discovery process should decline as a major source of revenue for
lawyers. 9 Although this may be unfortunate from the perspective
51. Hon. Robert D. Myers, MAD Track- An Experiment in Terror, 25 Ariz. ST.
L.J. 11 (1993) (publishing the results of the test program).
52. Id. at 20.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 23.
57. Frankel, supra note 25, at 258-59.
58. Id.
59. See Johnstone, supra note 28, at 5.
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of the legal community, the public will benefit from such a develop-
ment.60
A second feature of discovery that results in increased costs is
the requirement that a party ask the "right" questions in order to
receive the desired information. One party has the information,
while the other must attempt to extract it. One commentator has
referred to this problem as informational asymmetry.61 The party
receiving a discovery request has an incentive to play games and
attempt to hide information. Perhaps the most common abuse of
discovery is the tendency by the party receiving a discovery request
to interpret that request in the narrowest possible manner, thereby
allowing that party to conceal information on the grounds that his
opponent never properly asked for it.62 This tendency encourages
costly over-discovery by parties who are fearful that their opponent
is being less than honest in responding to discovery requests.
Because disclosure decreases the need for the party seeking
information to spend time attempting to determine exactly what
relevant information the other party may have in its possession, it
is more efficient than discovery. In discussing the proposed
adoption of a rule based on the Arizona model, the Committee
assigned to investigate the civil litigation process in Alaska stated
that Rule 26.1 "should reduce the inefficient groping in the dark
which is a significant component of present discovery practice."63
Disclosure places the burden of determining what information is
relevant and should be turned over on the party best equipped to
make that decision, namely the party in possession of that informa-
tion.' The key advantage of disclosure is that it minimizes the
opportunities that exist under discovery for opposing parties to play
games with each other.
4. Disclosure Should Produce Fairer Results. It is a
fundamental principle of the modern rules of civil procedure that
cases should be decided on their merits.'5 What disturbs many
60. Id.
61. Frankel, supra note 25, at 259.
62. See JoJene Mills, Practical Implications of the Zlaket Rules from a
Plaintiffs Lawyer's Perspective, 25 ARIz. ST. L.J. 149, 158 (1993).
63. Proposed ALASKA R. CIV. P. 26.1, committee cmt. (on file with author).
64. Frankel, supra note 25, at 264.
65. See Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966) ("If rules of
procedure work as they should in an honest and fair judicial system, they not only
permit, but should as nearly as possible guarantee that bona fide complaints be
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attorneys about a disclosure system is that if they are forced to
hand over information damaging to their case, they will, at worst,
lose the case, and at best, upset the client.' They worry, possibly
with some degree of justification, that clients simply will not
understand that their attorney has to help the other side by
volunteering information.67 Under a disclosure system, however,
every attorney would be subject to the same rules, so every
attorney would be able to explain that he is simply following the
rules. Ultimately, if one has a poor case, then one should either
settle or lose at trial. If a lawyer is able to misuse the discovery
process either to hide information or grind down a financially
disadvantaged opponent, that lawyer may have "won," but the
system as a whole suffers a loss of integrity.
5. Changing Lawyers'Attitudes. Many commentators believe
that discovery brings out the worst in lawyers and that the process
has in fact become little more than a costly game.68 The popular
perception is that far too many lawyers view discovery as a means
of wearing down their opponents, either by refusing to answer
discovery requests made in good faith or by burying the other side
in an avalanche of paper. Furthermore, modern lawyers are
trained to represent their clients zealously,69 which has led to the
belief that a lawyer must do anything and everything possible to
hinder his opponent in a lawsuit. 0 In essence, then, disclosure
runs counter to the instincts and training of many attorneys,7' and
this resulting tension is the source of much of the opposition to a
disclosure system in Alaska and elsewhere.
Judge Thomas Zlaket, the driving force behind the adoption
of a disclosure system in Arizona, has written about the develop-
ment of a legal culture that has spawned "Rambo" lawyers and
carried to an adjudication on the merits."); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48
(1957) ("The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in
which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the
principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the
merits.").
66. Carol C. Cure, Practical Considerations Concerning Arizona's New Rules
of Civil Procedure: A Defense Perspective, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 55, 66 (1993).
67. Id.
68. E.g., Zlaket, supra note 10, at 5.
69. See MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 1.3 (1983).
70. Zlaket, supra note 10, at 4-6.
71. See Schwarzer, supra note 9, at 704-05, 714-16.
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"scorched earth" litigation tactics.' The notion that some lawyers
have taken the adversary process beyond any reasonable limits,
however, is not a new one. Roscoe Pound's famous speech on the
causes of dissatisfaction with the administration of justice provides
an enlightening historical perspective on the types of problems that
can arise within the confines of the adversary process. Pound
wrote:
The effect of our exaggerated contentious procedure is not
only to irritate parties, witnesses and jurors in particular cases,
but to give to the whole community a false notion of the purpose
and end of law. Hence comes, in large measure, the modern
American race to beat the law. If the law is a mere game,
neither the players who take part in it nor the public who
witness it can be expected to yield to its spirit when their
interests are served by evading it.'
Arizona Rule 26.1 attempts to fundamentally alter the way the
litigation process is conducted. Disclosure, coupled with presump-
tive limits on the use of traditional discovery devices, should help
put an end to the abuses that have marred the discovery system.
If conducted in good faith, disclosure requires attorneys to aid their
opponents by providing them with information that may be
damaging to the disclosing party's case. As a result, the shift from
discovery to a system requiring extensive disclosure would involve
much more than a simple change in the Alaska Rules of Civil
Procedure. Adopting disclosure requirements similar to those in
place in Arizona would change the role of a lawyer in Alaska in
the litigation process.74 The Committee, in the notes to the
rejected proposal based on Arizona Rule 26.1, stated that adoption
of the rule "is a move towards having lawyers fill the role of
advocates, arguing the legal significance of facts, rather than as
adversaries, fighting over what facts will be available for consider-
ation."75
Although a disclosure system is designed to minimize the
opportunities for abuse that arise with discovery, it is also designed
to strike at the attitudes that are the underlying cause of those
72. Zlaket, supra note 10, at 3.
73. Pound, supra note 22, at 282.
74. Colin Campbell & John Rea, Civil Litigation and The Ethics of Mandatory
Disclosure: Moving Toward Brady v. Maryland, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 237, 238 (1993)
("[C]ivil litigators now must temper their zealous advocacy of client interest with
a higher ethical duty to the tribunal to seek the full presentation of the facts to the
fact finder.").
75. Proposed ALASKA R. Civ. P. 26.1, committee cmt. (on file with author).
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abuses. In essence, disclosure aims to create a system in which the
pretrial exchange of information is free from the adversarial
elements that have become so ingrained in every aspect of
American legal culture. The comments to Arizona Rule 26.1 state,
"[t]he intent of the amendments was to limit the adversarial nature
of the proceedings to those areas where there is a true and
legitimate dispute between the parties, and to preclude hostile,
unprofessional, and unnecessarily adversarial conduct on the part
of counsel."76 Disclosure is designed to create a system in which
attorneys are forced to cooperate and not compete in exchanging
information.77 It is hoped that disclosure will result in what
discovery was intended to be, a simple means of exchanging
relevant information and not a weapon in the litigation process.
It is undoubtedly true that attitudes will not change overnight
simply as a result of the passage of a new set of rules. The real
advantage of a disclosure system, however, is that it should result
in a less costly and more efficient exchange of information simply
because it inherently provides fewer opportunities for abuse. As
lawyers become accustomed to disclosing information and cooperat-
ing with their opponents, attitudes may gradually change and
compliance with disclosure may become accepted, not just as the
rule, but as the proper way to conduct litigation. This transforma-
tion has apparently begun to take place in Arizona as a result of
the new rule. Based on interviews with Arizona attorneys, one
commentator has stated that "[a]s the experiment progressed,
attorneys noticed that disclosure statements improved in quality.
This resulted in fewer broad, all-encompassing discovery requests
and more professional courtesy and honesty among attorneys in the
latter stages of the experiment."78 If a disclosure-based system
can successfully change lawyers' attitudes, the manner in which civil
litigation is conducted will profoundly improve.
B. The Problems with an Extensive Disclosure System
1. Complex Cases. Extensive disclosure should work most
effectively and achieve the best results in fairly simple, straightfor-
ward cases. In simple cases, because the issues, and, corresponding-
ly, the relevant witnesses and documents, should be clear to both
76. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1, court cmt. to the 1991 amend.
77. Id.
78. Myers, supra note 51, at 24.
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parties and the court, the parties should have little difficulty in
complying with disclosure in a timely manner, and it should be
evident to both parties and the court if one side is not disclosing
pertinent information.
Many of the benefits offered by a system based on disclosure,
however, seem to disappear when a complex case is involved,79
especially under the extensive disclosure requirements of Arizona
Rule 26.1.80 Although it is difficult to define a "complex" case,
the term is used here to refer to a case that necessitates a greater
than average amount of discovery. In complex cases, the scope of
relevant information may be enormous, making it difficult for a
party to determine exactly what information and documents must
be disclosed. The issues in a complex case are also not likely to be
well-defined in the early stages of the litigation, causing early
disclosure statements to likely be inadequate. Statistics from the
pilot program in Arizona reveal that in complex cases disclosure
did not accelerate the pretrial process or reduce the amount of
discovery both parties required to prepare their cases adequate-
ly.81
Arizona Rule 26.1 requires that initial disclosure be made
"within forty (40) days after the filing of a responsive pleading to
the Complaint, Counterclaim, Crossclaim or Third Party Complaint
unless the parties otherwise agree, or for good cause, the Court
shortens or extends the time."'  Given that Alaska employs a
notice pleading system,' however, in a complex case, a defendant
may have only a vague idea as to the exact nature of the plaintiff's
claim.' If the disclosure requirements of Arizona Rule 26.1 were
adopted in Alaska, the defendant would then have two options:
79. Id.
80. The amount of disclosure required under Alaska Rule 26 is limited and is
confined to facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings. Therefore, the
problems concerning the use of disclosure in complex cases will be much less likely
to arise. Section IV.C.2 of this note proposes to limit the use of disclosure in
complex cases. In effect, the section advocates the adoption of Arizona Rule
26.1's disclosure requirements for simple cases while retaining the disclosure
requirements of Alaska Rule 26 for complex cases.
81. Complex cases litigated under the disclosure rules required the same
number of depositions, interrogatories and requests as cases litigated under the
standard discovery rules. Myers, supra note 51, at 20, 21, 24.
82. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1(b)(1).
83. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 8.
84. See Cure, supra note 66, at 64.
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turn over a small amount of clearly relevant information and risk
being sanctioned for not turning over something later revealed to
have been relevant, or turn over everything that is even remotely
relevantY The former option is unfair to a defendant who is
trying to act in good faith, while the latter is wasteful and costly.
For reasons discussed below, the fact that a court could modify the
deadlines by order does little to solve this problem because it
forces the court to spend time and resources in order to determine
if there is good cause for ordering a modification.
The best solution in complex cases is to require a very limited
disclosure by the parties consistent with the limited disclosure
requirements that have been made part of Alaska Rule 26. An
example of an item that should be disclosed in complex cases is
information about expert witnesses. Parties would then be free to
develop their cases through unlimited discovery. Inevitably,
however, the pretrial exchange of information in a complex case
will be costly and time-consuming, and a disclosure requirement has
only marginal utility in complex cases.8 6
2. Compliance and Enforcement. Disclosure will be
effective only if both sides act in good faith. Disclosure operates,
in large part, on the honor system. Problems may occur if one
attorney has made a full disclosure, while the other side has failed
to turn over vital information, a deficiency that may not be exposed
until the case has been settled or tried, if exposed at all. Further-
more, if disclosure statements are routinely inadequate, parties will
feel compelled to conduct extensive discovery, and the benefits of
a disclosure system will vanish.' Ultimately, if attorneys want to
violate the spirit of a disclosure system by engaging in the type of
abuses that were a major source of the current dissatisfaction with
discovery, they will probably find a way to do so.
Nevertheless, disclosure should not be rejected as an alterna-
tive to discovery simply because creative attorneys may find
85. See id. at 61.
86. The complex case problem is discussed further in section IV.C of this note.
See infra.
87. Attorneys who were interviewed in Arizona commented that the amount
of discovery that had to be conducted varied in proportion to the quality of the
disclosure statement. A well-prepared disclosure statement generally left the
attorney receiving it with little need for additional discovery. Myers, supra note
51, at 24.
1994]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
loopholes in the system. Disclosure should be given a chance to
work, for it is unlikely that it could be more costly, inefficient or
subject to abuse than discovery has been. Furthermore, the pilot
program in Arizona offered encouraging results. Few abuses of the
disclosure system were reported, and the system operated with
less difficulty and fewer problems as familiarity with the require-
ments and nature of disclosure increased.89
Clearly, the threat of serious sanctions is necessary to ensure
that the disclosure system works, and such sanctions are, in fact,
part of Arizona Rule 26.1. Attorneys in Arizona who participat-
ed in the pilot program cited the threat of sanctions as a major
factor in the success of the disclosure rules.9 Although sanctions
are a necessary component of any disclosure system, if the system
is to maintain its integrity, those sanctions must be consistently
applied by all judges. Unfortunately, the language of Arizona Rule
26.1 does not lend itself to uniform enforcement, particularly in
complex cases.
Arizona Rule 26.1 requires a party to disclose information
regarding persons whom the party "believes may have knowledge
or information relevant to the events, transactions or occurrences
that gave rise to the action ... ."' In a similar vein, Rule
26.1(a)(9) requires a party to disclose documents "which that party
believes may be relevant to the subject matter of the action.... ."'
Terms such as "believes" and "relevant" are subjectively vague and
may make the rule difficult to enforce.94 It is easy to imagine a
party making a good faith claim that he or she did not believe a
particular document was relevant and needed to be disclosed.
Although judges will be able to make common sense judgments
about whether something should have been disclosed, variations in
their interpretations are almost certain to result.
Complex cases that will require the most extensive disclosure
will likely breed the most enforcement problems. In relatively
88. Id. at 25.
89. Id. at 24.
90. The sanctions available under Arizona Rule 26.1 include the exclusion of
evidence not disclosed, as well as the shifting of costs if one side forces the other
to engage in unnecessary discovery. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 26.1(c),(e).
91. Myers, supra note 51, at 26.
92. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 26.1(a)(4) (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 26.1(a)(9) (emphasis added).
94. See Cure, supra note 66, at 70.
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simple cases, it should be clear to both parties as well as the court
what is relevant, which in turn should make a determination of the
adequacy of a disclosure statement relatively easy. In a complex
case, where hundreds or thousands of documents may be at least
somewhat relevant, however, determining whether a party has
made a good faith disclosure may be extremely difficult. It follows,
therefore, that complex cases will be the ones most likely to
generate disputes between the parties during the disclosure process.
3. Satellite Litigation. Satellite litigation refers to disputes
that arise during litigation that have little to do with the actual
merits of the case. Satellite litigation is undesirable because it
consumes valuable time and money that lawyers and courts could
better spend elsewhere. A disclosure-based system has the
potential to spawn satellite litigation in two areas.9' First, parties
may file endless motions attacking the adequacy of their opponent's
disclosure statement. If courts are forced to entertain and
investigate a large number of these motions, the court system may
become even more clogged than it presently is. Second, given the
vague standards contained in Arizona Rule 26.1, parties that are
sanctioned can be expected to appeal, adding to the docket of the
appellate courts.
Although there seems to be a substantial potential for satellite
litigation in a disclosure system, such litigation did not arise during
the course of the pilot program in Arizona. Seven judges who
participated in the program expressed the consensus view that only
one or two disputes arose per month in the cases operating under
the disclosure system, while one or two disputes per week were the
norm in cases using standard discovery. 6 Consequently, these
judges spent less time settling disclosure/discovery disputes and had
more time to devote to other matters. These results bode well for
the success of a disclosure system in Alaska, as any reduction in
satellite litigation represents a significant advantage.
4. Disclosure's Impact on the Work-Product Privilege. The
work-product doctrine is well established in Alaska.97 Essentially,
the doctrine allows an attorney to refuse to disclose or turn over to
95. See id. for a discussion of how disclosure can create problems that might
lead to satellite litigation.
96. Myers, supra note 51, at 21.
97. See ALASKA R. Crv. P. 26(b)(3).
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the opposing party any documents prepared by the attorney in
preparation for litigation. The mental impressions and opinions of
an attorney, for example, are protected by the work-product
privilege. The adoption of an Arizona style disclosure system in
Alaska would almost certainly infringe on the work-product
doctrine. By requiring parties to disclose the legal theories upon
which each claim is based, including citations to pertinent authori-
ty,9 Arizona Rule 26.1(a)(2) infringes on the work-product
privilege. Many opponents of disclosure dislike the system for this
very reason.9  These opponents complain that incompetent or
lazy attorneys will be able to freeload from their more skilled and
energetic opponents by borrowing their opponent's work as
contained in the disclosure statement. In some cases this will
undoubtedly be true, although it seems intuitively unlikely that an
attorney who routinely relies on his opponent's work will end up
winning many cases. As a necessary evil, attorneys will have to
accept a certain amount of erosion of the work-product doctrine to
realize the full benefits of disclosure.1°°
IV. COMBINING DISCLOSURE WITH A DIFFERENTIATED CASE
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: A PROPOSAL FOR IMPROVING THE
DISCLOSURE SYSTEM
A. The Proposal
Many of the potential problems with a disclosure system could
be avoided or minimized, while the benefits could be retained, if
disclosure was combined with a tracking or differentiated case
management system ("DCM"). DCM involves placing cases into
categories, or tracks, based on the complexity of the issues and the
amount of time necessary for completing the pretrial exchange of
98. ARIz. R. Civ. P. 26.1(a)(2).
99. The Committee Comment to proposed Rule 26.1 recognized this
infringement but justified it on the ground that it will "reduce the inefficient
groping in the dark which is a significant component of present discovery
practice." See Cure, supra note 66, at 75.
100. By comparison, the disclosure requirements contained in Alaska Rule 26
do not infringe on the work-product doctrine. Rule 26 does not require disclosure
of a party's legal theories, and statements made by witnesses must be turned over
only if they are not privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure. Alaska
Rule 26 simply functions as the equivalent of standard interrogatories. Informa-
tion that was previously privileged under the work-product doctrine is still
privileged under Alaska Rule 26.
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information.' Each track would have its own rule regarding the
amount of disclosure required, its own limits on the use of
traditional discovery methods and its own trial schedule. For
example, simple negligence cases would be assigned to the fast
track, cases of average complexity, such as a medical malpractice
action, would be assigned to the average track, and complex cases,
such as an employment discrimination action, would be assigned to
the complex track. °2 These three options are merely offered as
examples; the number and specification of tracks will be discussed
below.103
This proposed DCM system would vary the amounts of
disclosure and discovery in a given case based on its track assign-
ment. In a simple case, where the issues should be fairly narrow
and clear to both parties, extensive disclosure would be required,
while the use of traditional discovery methods would be capped at
low levels. In a complex case, where disclosure does not work
particularly well,"° disclosure would be limited to a few basic
items, such as a list of expert witnesses, while the use of traditional
discovery methods would be unlimited. Cases of average complexi-
ty would require more disclosure than a complex case but less than
a simple case, and the limits on discovery would be higher than
those in a simple case.
Such a system would retain the benefits of a disclosure system,
while avoiding or minimizing many of its flaws. Alaska already has
some familiarity with a simplified version of a DCM system, as
Rule 16.1 has been in effect in Anchorage Superior Courts for
several years.'05 Several federal district courts have also experi-
mented with a DCM system in recent years as part of the Civil
Justice Reform Act. 0 6
101. For a good discussion of tracking, see Richard McMillan, Jr. & David B.
Siegal, Creating a Fast Track Alternative Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 431 (1985).
102. It is important to note that cases would be classified on an individual basis.
A medical malpractice case, for example, could be simple, average or complex
depending on the facts of that particular case.
103. See infra notes 114-122 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
105. Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 16.1 is Alaska's fast track rule, under which
parties can elect to have their case placed on an accelerated trial track.
106. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1993). Section 473(a)(1) allows for experimentation
with
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DCM is part of a larger debate on the merits of trans-substan-
tive rules of civil procedureY°7 Some commentators argue that a
simple negligence case should not be treated in the same manner
or be subject to the same rules of procedure as a complex discrimi-
nation or product liability suit.1"8 Other commentators contend
that any effort to adopt different rules of procedure for different
types of cases will prove unworkable and lead to a further
politicization of the rulemaking process."
The disclosure requirements of Alaska Rule 26 are trans-
substantive in that they will be uniformly applied to all types of
cases. Such a broad application of the disclosure rules fails to take
into account that the effectiveness of disclosure varies with the
complexity of the case. Statistics from Arizona indicate that
disclosure has little impact on the cost or time involved in exchang-
ing information in complex cases, and, for reasons discussed earlier
in this note, requiring extensive disclosure in complex cases may
actually lead to negative results. ° By comparison, disclosure
should be highly effective in simple or even average cases. By
varying the amount of required disclosure with the complexity of
the case, the disclosure rules can be made more case-specific and
should be more effective.
The Alaska Supreme Court has also created presumptive limits
on the use of traditional discovery procedures as part of the effort
systematic, differential treatment of civil cases that tailors the level of
individualized and case specific management to such criteria as case
complexity, the amount of time reasonably needed to prepare the case
for trial, and the judicial and other resources required and available for
the preparation and disposition of the case.
28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(1).
107. Although this debate has taken place within the context of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the issues pertain to state rules of civil procedure as well.
108. See, e.g., John P. Frank, The Rules of Civil Procedure-Agenda for Reform,
137 U. PA. L. REv. 1883, 1891 (1989); see also Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 2211-
12.
109. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly
Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules
of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. RaV. 2067, 2079-85 (1989); see also Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237,2244-46 (1989). The implications of this
debate need only be considered for the purpose of this note insofar as they relate
to the use of discovery and disclosure.
110. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
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to reform pretrial proceedings. 1' These limits apply uniformly,
but they can be exceeded upon stipulation of the parties 12 or by
order of the court upon a showing of good cause."' Clearly, the
intent of the Alaska Supreme Court in allowing for exceptions was
to provide for flexibility in the rules so that cases requiring more
discovery than ordinary would not be subject to the presumptive
limits. Thus, the court has recognized that not all cases are alike
and that, in at least some cases, the rules will have to be revised.
The court's attempt to mitigate the rigidity inherent in trans-
substantive rules, however, is likely to create problems. It may be
difficult to get parties to stipulate to additional discovery, in which
case the court will be forced to hear motions asking for additional
discovery. Such motions will take up valuable resources of both
the court and the parties. It is much more efficient to establish
different rules in advance to govern different types of cases,
thereby removing the need for parties to argue, in or out of court,
over exactly how much additional discovery is needed.
B. Model DCM Systems
A major question in any DCM system is how to determine in
what track or category a case belongs. Any system of classification
is destined to be somewhat artificial, and some cases will end up
being placed on an inappropriate track. The members of the
Alaska Bar Association should determine the number of tracks and
the types of cases that will be placed on those tracks because they
are the most qualified to make such decisions. Several possible
models for DCM do exist, however.
As a result of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,114 two
federal district courts have begun experimenting with DCM
systems. The Western District of Michigan has implemented a
plan, effective September 1, 1992, that employs six tracks: voluntary
expedited, expedited, standard, complex, highly complex and
administrative." 5 Each track has a schedule for when discovery
111. Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure 30 and 33 establish presumptive limits for
depositions and interrogatories, respectively.
112. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 29.
113. Id. 26(b)(2).
114. Codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1993).
115. DIFFERENTIATED CASE MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES DIsTRICT
COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN: ANNUAL ASSESSMENT,
SEPTEMBER 1, 1992-AUGUST 31, 1993, at 4-6 (1994).
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must be completed, and each requires that cases ultimately be
disposed of within a certain time period. Mandatory disclosure is
not a part of the Michigan plan, but each track establishes
presumptive limits on the use of discovery.
To understand how the system works, it is worth setting out
the exact components of two of the tracks. On the expedited track,
cases are expected to be disposed of within nine to twelve months
from the date the complaint is filed, and discovery must be
completed within 120 days from the date of the case management
conference. Furthermore, interrogatories are limited to twenty
single-part questions, and no more than four fact witness deposi-
tions can be taken per party without prior approval of the court.
By comparison, cases assigned to the complex track must be
disposed of fifteen to twenty-four months from the date the
complaint is filed, and discovery must be completed within 270 days
of the date of the case management conference. Interrogatories are
limited to fifty single-part questions, and no more than fifteen fact
witness depositions per party can be taken without prior approval
of the court.
It is still too early to assess the impact of the DCM program
with any degree of certainty. However, statistics compiled by the
court suggest that case dispositions may be occurring earlier under
DCM." 6
The Northern District of Ohio has also implemented a DCM
plan under the Civil Justice Reform Act."7 The Ohio plan has
five tracks: expedited, standard, complex, administrative and mass
tort. It imposes even more extensive limits on the use of discovery
than does the Michigan plan. Cases on the standard track in Ohio,
for example, are limited to thirty-five single-part interrogatories,
twenty requests for production of documents, twenty requests for
admissions, three non-party fact witness depositions per party, in
addition to party depositions, and such other discovery as may be
provided for in the case management plan. The Ohio plan also
provides a list of characteristics for the types of cases that should
be assigned to each track."8 Track assignments are ultimately
116. Id. at 18.
117. N.D. OHIO R. 8:1.1-8:8.3.
118. Id. at 8:2.2. The characteristics of the standard cases can be described as
follows:
Legal issues: More than a few, some unsettled.
Required Discovery: Routine.
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determined at a case management conference following a recom-
mendation as to the proper track from the court. As with the
Michigan plan, the Ohio plan does not require any mandatory
disclosure. The results of the plan have been encouraging so far,
although it is still too soon for any final conclusions about its
success.
119
The Justices of the Superior Court in Massachusetts established
a tracking system in 1988.12 The Massachusetts plan uses three
tracks: fast, average and accelerated. It also requires that items
such as service and discovery requests be completed within a
certain time frame and prescribes no presumptive limits on
discovery nor any requirements for mandatory disclosure. What is
of great interest, however, is the effort of the Superior Court to
actually list the types of cases that should be placed on each track.
The fast track includes seventeen different types of cases, grouped
into four broad categories: contract, tort, real property and
equitable remedies. 21 The average track includes sixteen differ-
ent types of cases, grouped into three broad categories: tort,
equitable remedies and miscellaneous." Finally, the accelerated
track contains thirteen different types of cases, all of which fall
under a miscellaneous heading. Although the Massachusetts plan
lacks discovery limits or a disclosure system, its attempt to establish
such a detailed system of case classification warrants further
investigation.
Number of Real Parties in Interest: Up to five.
Number of Fact Witnesses: Up to ten.
Expert Witnesses: Two or three.
Likely Trial Days: Five to ten.
Suitability for Alternative Dispute Resolution: Moderate to high.
Character and Nature of Damage Claims: Routine.
The other categories have similar classifications.
Id.
119. See UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
OHIO, ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL DOCKET PURSUANT TO
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990, at 5 (1993) [hereinafter N.D. OHIO
REPORT].
120. Standing Order 1-88 of the Massachusetts Superior Court (last amended
Apr. 25, 1990).
121. The fast track contract category, for example, includes service, labor and
materials; goods sold and delivered; commercial paper; sales or lease of real estate;
and other. Id.
122. The average track tort category includes products liability, malpractice-
medical, malpractice-other, wrongful death, defamation and asbestos cases.
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C. Benefits of Combining DCM with Rule 26.1
1. DCM Should Further Accelerate the Resolution of Cases.
Statistics from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio, which has employed a system of DCM since
January 1, 1992, tentatively indicate that DCM improves the speed
with which cases are resolved."z The annual assessment states
that "[n]ew case filings are being resolved at a significantly quicker
pace under DCM. While thirty-nine percent of the cases filed in
1992 [using DCM] were terminated by December 31, only thirty-
four percent of the cases filed during 1991 were closed by Decem-
ber 31 of that year."124 The statistics are even more impressive
when viewed on a monthly basis. Cases which have been on the
docket for six months or longer are terminated at a substantially
faster rate when DCM is employed than when it is not."z
Although it is impossible to tell exactly how disclosure and
DCM will work together in practice, the two should prove to be
mutually reinforcing and further expedite the resolution of cases.
Disclosure allows parties to make an early assessment of their case.
It should also permit them to prepare more quickly for trial, as
they will not have to spend as much time on discovery. These
positive effects of disclosure should allow for faster tracks under a
DCM system than would be possible if parties were forced to
obtain information through traditional discovery methods.
2. DCM Will Solve the Complex Case Problem. As
discussed previously in this note,126 disclosure is likely to prove
unworkable, or at least highly inefficient, in complex cases. DCM
addresses this problem by employing different rules on disclosure
and discovery for different types of cases. By specifying, within
fairly broad parameters, the amount of disclosure that is required
and the amount of discovery that is allowed in certain types of
cases, the benefits of disclosure can be maximized, while its
problems can be minimized. In a complex case, where the issues
123. According to the report issued by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, it is still too early to determine the effects of DCM.
N.D. OHIO REPORT, supra note 119, at 5.
124. Id. at 10.
125. See id. at 11 (chart).
126. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
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are often muddled, it is more efficient to allow the parties to
control the exchange of information through the use of extensive
discovery. If parties are forced to make sweeping disclosures in a
complex case, particularly at early stages in the litigation process,
the disclosure statements run the risk of being highly over or
under-inclusive. Compliance will also be difficult to monitor in
complex cases. 7 Complex cases need to be treated differently
from simple ones, and DCM accomplishes that.
3. Compliance With Disclosure Rules Will be Easier to
Monitor. Given the vague standards involved in Arizona Rule 26.1,
it will be increasingly difficult to monitor compliance with the
disclosure rules as the complexity of the cases increase. The more
complex the case is, the more difficult it will be to determine if a
party has disclosed everything that it "believed" was "relevant."
The solution to this problem is to vary the amount of disclosure
with the type of case. Such a system could be established as part
of a larger DCM structure. Under a DCM system, extensive
disclosure would be required in the cases assigned to the simple
track. As a general rule, it should be fairly easy to monitor
compliance with disclosure rules in simple cases because the
relevant information that must be disclosed should be readily
apparent to both parties as well as the court. In complex cases,
disclosure would be limited to very basic information, such as a list
of expert witnesses and a summary of the proposed testimony of
those witnesses. By limiting disclosure in this manner, problems
with enforcement will be unlikely to arise, as it should be apparent
to both parties and the court if one party has failed to comply with
the limited disclosure requirementg.
As discussed above, DCM will also decrease the potential for
satellite litigation under a disclosure system." The majority of
disputes in a disclosure system can be expected to arise in complex
cases, where the relevance standard of Arizona Rule 26.1 would be
particularly difficult to enforce. By limiting disclosure in complex
cases to a few simple items, the potential for satellite litigation in
these cases should significantly decrease.
127. See infra section IV.C.3.
128. Myers, supra note 51, at 21.
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D. Potential Problems With the DCM System
1. Lawyers' Attitudes. The current dissatisfaction with
discovery stems in large part from the fact that far too many
lawyers violate the spirit, if not the rules, of the discovery system.
Although a DCM system combining the use of disclosure and
discovery should make it more difficult for lawyers to abuse the
information exchange process, lawyers who find it in their best
interests to do so will undoubtedly find ways to "beat the system."
The simple truth is that there are no magical solutions to the
problem of rising costs and excessively adversarial tactics in
litigation. Changing the rules can help, but a real effort must be
made on the part of the members of the bar if those rules are to be
effective."2 9 Disclosure is worth trying, however, because the
system's inherent features leave it less vulnerable to abuse than the
discovery system.
2. Parties Will Fight Over Track Assignments. Some commen-
tators who support the use of trans-substantive rules do so in part
because they fear that the adoption of multiple sets of rules will
simply result in parties wasting time and resources fighting over
which set of rules should apply."' If parties are allowed to select
their track assignments, such fighting will undoubtedly result, as
parties will attempt to pick a track that will give them a tactical
advantage. The solution is to set up a system in which the parties
have only a minimal voice in how matters such as the appropriate
track assignment are determined. Track assignments should be
determined by the judge on the basis of the complaint, answer, and,
if necessary, short briefs from each party on which track assignment
is proper. The judge's decision would not be appealable. Obvious-
ly, if the parties can agree on the appropriate track, then they
should be allowed to have their case placed on that track.
129. Thomas Ziaket, a leading force behind the adoption of the disclosure
system in Arizona, has written, "If the bench and bar are willing to give them a
good faith try, the rules can succeed. Otherwise, they will likely fail." Zlaket,
supra note 10, at 9.
130. See Carrington, supra note 109, at 2081. But see Stephen N. Subrin,
Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging
Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999, 2049 (1989).
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V. CONCLUSION
In the past, efforts to make significant reforms in the litigation
process by changing the rules of procedure have met with limited
success at best. In some cases, creating new rules or revising old
ones simply opens up more avenues for abuse and confusion. The
same may be true of the disclosure systems discussed in this note.
The system of discovery, at least in its present form, has generated
a great deal of criticism, and sound proposals for revamping the
system are worth exploring. Disclosure has the potential to reduce
the cost of litigation, while helping to ensure that just results are
achieved. In time, disclosure may even foster the creation of a
more professional and cooperative legal environment, although
changing the adversarial nature of pretrial proceedings may prove
impossible.
Although disclosure has many potential benefits, it is not a
perfect solution, and the effectiveness of disclosure varies with the
complexity of the case at hand. For this reason, cases should be
categorized, and the amount of disclosure required and the amount
of discovery allowed should be varied depending on which category
the case is placed in. In theory, such a system could maximize the
benefits of disclosure while limiting the negative aspects. A system
of differentiated case management in which mandatory disclosure
is a key component has the potential to bring about significant
improvements in the litigation process.
Jeffrey D. Collins
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APPENDIX A
ALASKA RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 261
RULE 26. GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DIS-
COVERY; DUTY OF DISCLOSURE.
(a) REQUIRED DISCLOSURES; METHODS TO DISCOVER
ADDITIONAL MATTER. Disclosure under subparagraphs (a)(1)
and (2) of this rule is required in all civil actions except domestic
relations and adoption proceedings.
(1) INITIAL DISCLOSURES. Except to the extent otherwise
directed by order or rule, a party shall, without awaiting a
discovery request, provide to other parties:
(A) the factual basis of each of its claims or defenses;
(B) the name and, if known, the address and telephone
number of each individual likely to have discoverable informa-
tion relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the
pleadings, identifying the subjects of the information and
whether the attorney-client privilege applies;
(C) the name and, if known, the address and telephone
number of each individual who has made a written or recorded
statement and, unless the statement is privileged or otherwise
protected from disclosure, either a copy of the statement or the
name and, if known, the address and telephone number of the
custodian;
(D) subject to the provisions of Civil Rule 26(b)(3), a copy
of, or a description by category and location of, all documents,
data compilations, and tangible things that are relevant to
disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings;
(E) subject to the provisions of Civil Rule 26(b)(3), all
photographs, diagrams, and videotapes of persons, objects,
scenes and occurrences that are relevant to disputed facts alleged
with particularity in the pleadings;
(F) each insurance agreement under which any person
carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or
all of a judgment which may be entered in the action or to
indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the
judgment; and
(G) all categories of damages claimed by the disclosing
party, and a computation of each category of special damages,
making available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34
the documents or other evidentiary material, not privileged or
protected from disclosure, on which such claims are based,
including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries
suffered.
1. Effective July 15, 1995.
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Unless otherwise directed by the court, these disclosures shall be
made within 10 days after the meeting of the parties under
paragraph (f). A party shall make its initial disclosures based on
the information then reasonably available to it and is not
excused from making its disclosures because it has not fully
completed its investigation of the case or because it challenges
the sufficiency of another party's disclosures or because another
party has not made its disclosures.
(2) DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY.
(A) In addition to the disclosures required by subpara-
graph (a)(1), a party shall disclose to other parties the identity
of any person who may be used at trial to present evidence
under Evidence Rules 702, 703, or 705.
(B) Except as otherwise stipulated or directed by the court,
this disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or
specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or
whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve giving
expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared
and signed by the witness. The report shall contain a complete
statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and
reasons therefor; the data or other information considered by
the witness in forming the opinions; any exhibits to be used as
a summary of or support for the opinions; the qualifications of
the witness, including a list of all publications authored by the
witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be
paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other
cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by
deposition within the preceding four years.
(C) These disclosures shall be made at the times and in the
sequence directed by the court. The parties shall supplement
these disclosures when required under subparagraph (e)(1).
(D) No more than three independent expert witness [sic]
may testify for each side as to the same issue in any given case.
For purposes of this rule, an independent expert is an expert
from whom a report is required under section (a)(2)(B). The
court, upon the showing of good cause, may increase or decrease
the number of independent experts to be called.
(3) PRETRIAL DISCLOSURES. In addition to the disclosures
required in the preceding paragraphs, a party shall provide to
other parties the following information regarding the evidence
that it may present at trial other than solely for impeachment
purposes:
(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the address
and telephone number of each witness, separately identifying
those whom the party expects to present and those whom the
party may call if the need arises;
(B) the designation of those witnesses whose testimony is
expected to be presented by means of a deposition and, if not
taken stenographically, a transcript of the pertinent portions of
the deposition testimony; and
(C) an appropriate identification of each document or
other exhibit, including summaries of other evidence, separately
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identifying those which the party expects to offer and those
which the party may offer if the need arises.
These disclosures shall be made at the times and in the sequence
directed by the court. Within 14 days thereafter, unless a
different time is specified by the court, a party may serve and
file a list disclosing (i) any objections to the use under Rule
32(a) of deposition designated by another party under subpara-
graph (B) and (ii) any objection, together with the grounds
therefor, that may be made to the admissibility of materials
identified under subparagraph (C). Objections not so disclosed,
other than objections under Rules 402 and 403 of the Rules of
Evidence, shall be waived unless excused by the court for good
cause shown.
(4) FORM OF DISCLOSURES. Unless otherwise directed by
the court, all disclosures under subparagraphs (a)(1) and (2) shall
be made in writing, signed, and served in accordance with Rule
5.
(5) METHODS TO DISCOVER ADDITIONAL MATrER.
Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the following
methods: deposition upon oral examination or written questions;
written interrogatories; production of documents or things or
permission to enter upon land or other property, for inspection
and other purposes; physical and mental examinations; and
requests for admission.
(b) DISCOVERY SCOPE AND LIMITS. Unless otherwise
limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the
scope of discovery is as follows:
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or
defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense
of any other party, including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or
other tangible things and the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of any discoverable matter. The information
sought need not be admissible at the trial if the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
(2) Limitations. The court may alter the limits in these
rules on the number of depositions and interrogatories, the
length of depositions under Rule 30, and the number of requests
under Rule 36. The frequency or extent of use of the discovery
methods otherwise permitted under these rules shall be limited
by the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from
some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or
less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample
opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information
sought; or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the
case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the
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importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.
The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice
or pursuant to a motion under paragraph (c).
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions
of subparagraph (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery
of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under
subparagraph (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that
other party's representative (including the other party's attorney,
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a
showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of
the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the
party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering
discovery of such materials when the required showing has been
made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an
attorney or other representative of a party concerning the
litigation.
A party may obtain without the required showing a
statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously
made by that party. Upon request, a person not a party may
obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the
action or its subject matter previously made by that person. If
the request is refused, the person may move for a court order.
The provisions of Rule 37(a) (4) apply to the award of expenses
incurred in relation to the motion. For purposes of this
paragraph, a statement previously made is (A) a written
statement signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the
person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical,
or other recording, or a transcription thereoft which is a
substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person
making it and contemporaneously recorded.
(4) Trial Preparation: Experts.
(A) A party may depose any person who has been
identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial.
If a report from the expert is required under section (a)(2)(B),
the deposition shall not be conducted until after the report is
provided.
(B) A party may, through interrogatories or by deposition,
discover facts known and opinions held by an expert who has
been retained or specially employed by another party in
anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not
expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in
Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances
under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to
obtain facts and opinions on the same subject by other means.
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, (i) the court
shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a
reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under
this subparagraph; and (ii) with respect to discovery obtained
under section (b)(4)(B) of this rule the court shall require the
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party seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of
the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in
obtaining facts and opinions from the expert.
(5) Claims of Privilege or Protection of Trial Preparation
Materials. When a party withholds information otherwise
discoverable under these rules by claiming that it is privileged or
subject to protection as trial preparation material, the party shall
make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the
documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed
in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged
or protected, will enable other parties to assess the applicability
of the privilege or protection.
(c) PROTECrIVE ORDERS. Upon motion by a party or by
the person from whom discovery is sought, accompanied by a
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or
attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to
resolve the dispute without court action, and for good cause
shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively,
on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the judicial
district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoy-
ance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,
including one or more of the following: (1) that the disclosure or
discovery not be had; (2) that the disclosure or discovery may
be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a
designation of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be
had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by
the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be
inquired into, or that the scope of the disclosure or discovery be
limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with
no one present except persons designated by the court; (6) that
a deposition, after being sealed, be opened only by order of the
court; (7) that a trade secret or other confidential research,
development, or commercial information not be revealed or be
revealed only in a designated way; and (8) that the parties
simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed
in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or
in part, the court may, on such terms and conditions as are just,
order that any party or other person provide or permit discovery.
The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses
incurred in relation to the motion.
(d) TIMING AND SEQUENCE OF DISCOVERY. Except when
authorized under these rules or by order of the court or
agreement of the parties, a party may not seek discovery from
any source before the parties have met and conferred as
required by paragraph (f). Unless the court upon motion, for
the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests ofjustice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in
any sequence, and the fact that a party is conducting discovery,
whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not operate to delay
any other party's discovery.
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(e) SUPPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURES AND RESPONSES.
A party who has made a disclosure under paragraph (a) or
responded to a request for discovery with a disclosure or
response is under a duty to supplement or correct the disclosure
or response to include information thereafter acquired if ordered
by the court or in the following circumstances:
(1) A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate
intervals its disclosure under paragraph (a) if the party learns
that in some material respect the information disclosed is
incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective
information had not otherwise been made known to the other
parties during the discovery process or in writing. With respect
to testimony of an expert from whom a report is required under
subdivision (a)(2)(B) the duty extends both to information
contained in the report and to information provided through a
deposition of the expert.
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior
response to an interrogatory, request for production, or request
for admission if the party learns that the response is in some
material respect incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or
corrective information has not otherwise been made known to
the other parties during the discovery process or in writing.
(f) MEETING OF PARTIES; PLANNING FOR DISCOVERY.
Except when otherwise ordered, the parties shall, as soon as
practicable and in any event at least 14 days before a scheduling
conference is held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b),
meet to discuss the nature and basis of their claims and defenses
and the possibilities for a prompt settlement or resolution of the
case, or to make or arrange for the disclosures required by
subparagraph (a)(1), and to develop a proposed discovery plan.
The plan shall indicate the parties' views and proposals concern-
ing:
(1) what changes should be made in the timing or form of
disclosures under paragraph (a), including a statement as to
when disclosures under subparagraph (a)(1) were made or will
be made, and what are appropriate intervals for supplementation
of disclosure under Rule 26(e)(1);
(2) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when
discovery should be completed, and whether discovery should be
conducted in phases or be limited to or focused upon particular
issues;
(3) what changes should be made in the limitations on
discovery imposed under these rules and what other limitations
should be imposed;
(4) whether a scheduling conference is unnecessary; and
(5) any other orders that should be entered by the court
under paragraph (c) or under Rule 16(b) and (c).
The attorneys of record and all unrepresented parties that
have appeared in the case are jointly responsible for arranging
and being present or represented at the meeting, for attempting
in good faith to agree on the proposed discovery plan, and for
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submitting to the court within 10 days after the meeting a
written report outlining the plan.
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APPENDIX B
ARIZONA RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26.1
RULE 26.1 PROMPT DISCLOSURE OF INFORMA-
TION(a) DUTY TO DISCLOSE, SCOPE. Within the times set forth
in subdivision (b), each party shall disclose in writing to every
other party:
(1) The factual basis of the claim or defense. In the
event of multiple claims or defenses, the factual basis for each
claim or defense.
(2) The legal theory upon which each claim or defense is
based including, where necessary for a reasonable understanding
of the claim or defense, citations of pertinent legal or case
authorities.
(3) The names, addresses and telephone numbers of any
witnesses whom the disclosing party expects to call at trial with
a designation of the subject matter about which each witness
might be called to testify.
(4) The names and addresses of all persons whom the
party believes may have knowledge or information relevant to
the events, transactions, or occurrences that gave rise to the
action, and the nature of the knowledge or information each
such individual is believed to possess.
(5) The names and addresses of all persons who have
given statements, whether written or recorded, signed or
unsigned, and the custodian of the copies of those statements.
(6) The name and address of each person whom the
disclosing party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, the
subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, the
substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is
expected to testify, a summary of the grounds for each opinion,
the qualifications of the witness and the name and address of the
custodian of copies of any reports prepared by the expert.
(7) A computation and the measure of damage alleged by
the disclosing party and the documents or testimony on which
such computation and measure are based and the names,
addresses, and telephone numbers of all damage witnesses.
(8) The existence, location, custodian and general
description of any tangible evidence or relevant documents that
the disclosing party plans to use at trial and relevant insurance
agreements.
(9) A list of the documents or, in case of voluminous
documentary information, a list of the categories of documents,
known by a party to exist whether or not in the party's posses-
sion, custody or control and which that party believes may be
relevant to the subject matter of the action, and those which
appear reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissi-
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ble evidence, and the date(s) upon which those documents will
be made, or have been made, available for inspection and
copying. Unless good cause is stated for not doing so, a copy of
each document listed shall be served with the disclosure. If
production is not made, the name and address of the custodian
of the document shall be indicated. A party who produces
documents for inspection shall produce them as they are kept in
the usual course of business.
(b) TIME FOR DISCLOSURE; A CONTINUING DUTY
(1) The parties shall make the initial disclosure required
by subdivision(a) as fully as then possible within forty (40) days
after the filing of a responsive pleading to the Complaint,
Counterclaim, Crossclaim or Third Party Complaint unless the
parties otherwise agree, or for good cause, the Court shortens or
extends the time. For good cause, the court may shorten or
extend this time. If feasible, counsel shall meet to exchange
disclosures; otherwise, the disclosures shall be served as provided
by Rule 5. Upon each service of a disclosure, a notice of
disclosure shall be promptly filed with the court.
(2) The duty prescribed in subdivision (a) shall be a
continuing duty, and each party shall make additional or
amended disclosures whenever new or different information is
discovered or revealed. Such additional or amended disclosures
shall be made seasonably but in no event more than thirty (30)
days after the information is revealed to or discovered by the
disclosing party, but in no event later than sixty (60) days before
trial except by leave of court.
(3) All disclosures shall include information and data in
the possession, custody and control of the parties as well as that
which can be ascertained, learned or acquired by reasonable
inquiry and investigation.
(C) EXCLUSIONS OF UNDISCLOSED EVIDENCE. In addition
to any other sanction the court may impose, the court shall
exclude at trial any evidence offered by a party that was not
timely disclosed as required by this rule, except by leave of court
for good cause shown, and no party shall be permitted to
examine that party's witness to prove facts other than those
identified in the written disclosure to the party's opponents
except by leave of court for good cause shown.
(d) SIGNED DISCLOSURE. Each disclosure shall be made in
writing under oath, signed by the party making the disclosure.
(e) MISLEADING DISCLOSURE. A party or attorney who
makes a disclosure pursuant to this rule that the party or
attorney knew or should have known was inaccurate and thereby
causes an opposing party to engage in substantial unnecessary
investigation or discovery shall be ordered by the court to
reimburse the opposing party for the cost including attorneys'
fees of such unnecessary investigation or discovery and may be
subject to other appropriate sanctions as the court may direct.
(f) CLAIMS OF PRIVILEGE OR PROTECTION OF TRIAL
PREPARATION MATERIALS. When information is withheld from
disclosure or discovery on a claim that it is privileged or subject
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to protection as trial preparation materials, the claim shall be
made expressly and shall be supported by a description of the
nature of the documents, communications, or things not
produced or disclosed that is sufficient to enable other parties to
contest the claim.
(g) FAILURE TO COMPLY. If a party or attorney fails to
comply with the provisions of this rule, the court upon motion
of a party or on the court's own motion shall make such orders
with regard to such conduct as are just, including any of the
orders provided in Rule 16(f).

